😂 State v. Manuel 946 So. 2d 245 (La. Ct. App. 2006) Cited 10 times Holding that a defendant had a right under Louisiana law to run from an illegal frisk The 2006 amendment to La. R.S. 14:108, to include lawful detention within the definition of resisting arrest, supports a finding that the defendant did not violate La. R.S. 14:108 when he ran from the illegal detention. At the time of the incident, flight from detention, lawful or otherwise, was not included within the definition of resisting an officer. Again, in contrast to Sims and Cowart, the defendant here was not arrested for battery on an officer; rather he was searched incidental to his arrest for violating La. R.S. 14:108. However, because he did not commit that offense, he could not be legally arrested for it; moreover the State did not allege that he was arrested for any other offense. PAGE 6 People v. Johnson 231 Cal.App.3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) Cited 33 times Handcuffing the defendant while questioning him eliminated the possibility of assault or escape and did not transform detention into arrest Defendant relies on Penal Code section 835, which states: "An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person, or by submission to the custody of an officer. The person arrested may be subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and detention." (Italics added.) He implies that a state statutory definition of "arrest" can alter constitutional distinctions between detention and arrest. No authority is cited, and we know of none. PAGE 14 Posr v. Doherty 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1991) Cited 671 times 3 more… Holding that false arrest, for purposes of a § 1983 claim, "may be complete without either a formal arrest or a detention until the subject is arraigned" The district court first concluded that Holihan did not effect an arrest at all because he "did not formally arrest the plaintiff, nor did he detain him until he would be brought before the justice system," citing to Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 30 N.Y.2d 466, 334 N.Y.S.2d 632, 285 N.E.2d 871 (1972). In adopting this definition of arrest and detention for purposes of both the state law tort and the § 1983 constitutional violation, we believe the district court erred. In our view, both torts may be complete without either a formal arrest or a detention until the subject is arraigned. PAGE 96 Evans v. State 113 Md. App. 347 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) Cited 6 times 2 more… I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the conviction for reasons that I have listed below. I believe the majority has reached a wrong decision because it has defined arrest incorrectly and, consequently, has wrongly determined that the police search in this case was violative of the constitutional rules established for permissible searches incident to arrest. The court's opinion defines arrest to be not only the taking, seizing and the detention of another, but also the placing of formal charges. The majority then finds that the failure to charge after a detention makes the detention an illegal arrest. The incorrect definition will have the consequence of forcing the police, after each custodial search without a warrant, to institute prosecution, or else endure the probable suppression of evidence they have gathered incident to the custodial detention. PAGE 369 Thompson v. State No. 10-12-00279-CR (Tex. App. May. 30, 2013) Cited 1 times Finding that appellant was not under custodial detention where, in part, "appellant was not placed in handcuffs, nor did the officers tell appellant that he could not leave" In his second and third issues, appellant complains about the jury charge. Specifically, appellant contends that the failure to include definitions for "lawful detention" and "lawful arrest" and an instruction pursuant to article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure caused him egregious harm; thus, his conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. PAGE 13 Pantazes v. Pantazes 77 Md. App. 712 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) Cited 16 times 1 more… Giving effect to the intent of the parties, as expressed in the ordinary meaning of the words in their agreement, is not a simple task. The phrase "arrest, detention or confinement" cannot be accurately defined within the four corners of the agreement. Words like "arrest" and "detention" are vague and their definitions are context dependent. "Arrest" when used in the criminal context describes a more specific and formal act than when that term is used in a civil context. Compare Morton v. State, 284 Md. 526, 530, 397 A.2d 1385 (1979) (quoted in note 5) with Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 487, 109 A.2d 128 (1954) (Any exercise of force, or threat of force, by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he does not wish to go, is an imprisonment.), the definition of "arrest" also varies within the criminal context, compare Morton, 284 Md. at 530, 397 A.2d 1385 (quoted in note 5) with U.S. v. Sayers, 698 F.2d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 1983) ("Arrest" as used in the Speedy Trial Act refers to the point at which a defendant is… PAGE 722 United States v. Leal-Felix 665 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) Cited 27 times Reviewing de novo the district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, including whether to adopt a state law definition of "arrest" The dissent relies on Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), to argue that Supreme Court precedent does not support our definition of a formal arrest. Dissenting Op. 1047–48. The dissent observes that in Dunaway, the Court “cautioned against relying on ‘technical arrests' to invoke constitutional protections.” Dissenting Op. 1047–48 (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248). However, Dunaway dealt with a defendant who had been seized by the police, transported to a police station in a police car, and placed in an interrogation room where he was subjected to investigatory questioning after being given Miranda warnings. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248. This situation constituted a quintessential formal arrest under our definition. Indeed, the Court in Dunaway noted that “the detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest.” Id. at 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248. We agree that a formal arrest may take place whether or not a police officer “technically characterize[s his actions] as an arrest.” Id. at 214, 99 S.Ct. 2248.
Make no mistake…..I've had my share of these thugs. Long and short, the judge that over saw my case and his corrupt officers got time. Judge was facing 75yrs….but pleaded to 5yrs… cops 3-6. They will criminal create any chance they get. "Anything you say can AND WILL BE USED AGAINST YOU"……….Always remember that.
I'm 99% with Chili on 99% of his stuff, but going under a bridge with chop and both hands on the wheel things can still happen and people can get hurt with everyone sober, that being said… I've been shiiitfaced 60-70mph racin on a waverunner jumping wakes, 360s and all sorts of fun and luckily never got hurt drunk, only got hurt sober lol but PWCs have much better response time compared to larger boats, if your guna drink on a boat under age or not just be low key and don't attract attention by clowning around, like someone said they do not need PC to stop a boat for a safety inspection so don't have cans or bottles for them to see, traveling on the road is a good deal different, if he didn't flip the cop off they would all be drinking and partying lol
Otvo
Excellent
1
OTTVO
😢⁉️ Hit the LIKE BUDDEN‼️ Going woke now? Ebonics??
Officer is inside with a gun – you can't have a gun in a post office.
Maritime law is not the same as the laws of the US, tread lightly..
otvo
😂
State v. Manuel
946 So. 2d 245 (La. Ct. App. 2006) Cited 10 times
Holding that a defendant had a right under Louisiana law to run from an illegal frisk
The 2006 amendment to La. R.S. 14:108, to include lawful detention within the definition of resisting arrest, supports a finding that the defendant did not violate La. R.S. 14:108 when he ran from the illegal detention. At the time of the incident, flight from detention, lawful or otherwise, was not included within the definition of resisting an officer. Again, in contrast to Sims and Cowart, the defendant here was not arrested for battery on an officer; rather he was searched incidental to his arrest for violating La. R.S. 14:108. However, because he did not commit that offense, he could not be legally arrested for it; moreover the State did not allege that he was arrested for any other offense.
PAGE 6
People v. Johnson
231 Cal.App.3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) Cited 33 times
Handcuffing the defendant while questioning him eliminated the possibility of assault or escape and did not transform detention into arrest
Defendant relies on Penal Code section 835, which states: "An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person, or by submission to the custody of an officer. The person arrested may be subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and detention." (Italics added.) He implies that a state statutory definition of "arrest" can alter constitutional distinctions between detention and arrest. No authority is cited, and we know of none.
PAGE 14
Posr v. Doherty
944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1991) Cited 671 times
3 more…
Holding that false arrest, for purposes of a § 1983 claim, "may be complete without either a formal arrest or a detention until the subject is arraigned"
The district court first concluded that Holihan did not effect an arrest at all because he "did not formally arrest the plaintiff, nor did he detain him until he would be brought before the justice system," citing to Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 30 N.Y.2d 466, 334 N.Y.S.2d 632, 285 N.E.2d 871 (1972). In adopting this definition of arrest and detention for purposes of both the state law tort and the § 1983 constitutional violation, we believe the district court erred. In our view, both torts may be complete without either a formal arrest or a detention until the subject is arraigned.
PAGE 96
Evans v. State
113 Md. App. 347 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) Cited 6 times
2 more…
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the conviction for reasons that I have listed below. I believe the majority has reached a wrong decision because it has defined arrest incorrectly and, consequently, has wrongly determined that the police search in this case was violative of the constitutional rules established for permissible searches incident to arrest. The court's opinion defines arrest to be not only the taking, seizing and the detention of another, but also the placing of formal charges. The majority then finds that the failure to charge after a detention makes the detention an illegal arrest. The incorrect definition will have the consequence of forcing the police, after each custodial search without a warrant, to institute prosecution, or else endure the probable suppression of evidence they have gathered incident to the custodial detention.
PAGE 369
Thompson v. State
No. 10-12-00279-CR (Tex. App. May. 30, 2013) Cited 1 times
Finding that appellant was not under custodial detention where, in part, "appellant was not placed in handcuffs, nor did the officers tell appellant that he could not leave"
In his second and third issues, appellant complains about the jury charge. Specifically, appellant contends that the failure to include definitions for "lawful detention" and "lawful arrest" and an instruction pursuant to article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure caused him egregious harm; thus, his conviction should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
PAGE 13
Pantazes v. Pantazes
77 Md. App. 712 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) Cited 16 times
1 more…
Giving effect to the intent of the parties, as expressed in the ordinary meaning of the words in their agreement, is not a simple task. The phrase "arrest, detention or confinement" cannot be accurately defined within the four corners of the agreement. Words like "arrest" and "detention" are vague and their definitions are context dependent. "Arrest" when used in the criminal context describes a more specific and formal act than when that term is used in a civil context. Compare Morton v. State, 284 Md. 526, 530, 397 A.2d 1385 (1979) (quoted in note 5) with Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 487, 109 A.2d 128 (1954) (Any exercise of force, or threat of force, by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he does not wish to go, is an imprisonment.), the definition of "arrest" also varies within the criminal context, compare Morton, 284 Md. at 530, 397 A.2d 1385 (quoted in note 5) with U.S. v. Sayers, 698 F.2d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 1983) ("Arrest" as used in the Speedy Trial Act refers to the point at which a defendant is…
PAGE 722
United States v. Leal-Felix
665 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) Cited 27 times
Reviewing de novo the district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, including whether to adopt a state law definition of "arrest"
The dissent relies on Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), to argue that Supreme Court precedent does not support our definition of a formal arrest. Dissenting Op. 1047–48. The dissent observes that in Dunaway, the Court “cautioned against relying on ‘technical arrests' to invoke constitutional protections.” Dissenting Op. 1047–48 (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248). However, Dunaway dealt with a defendant who had been seized by the police, transported to a police station in a police car, and placed in an interrogation room where he was subjected to investigatory questioning after being given Miranda warnings. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203, 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248. This situation constituted a quintessential formal arrest under our definition. Indeed, the Court in Dunaway noted that “the detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest.” Id. at 212, 99 S.Ct. 2248. We agree that a formal arrest may take place whether or not a police officer “technically characterize[s his actions] as an arrest.” Id. at 214, 99 S.Ct. 2248.
Otvo!!!
Make no mistake…..I've had my share of these thugs. Long and short, the judge that over saw my case and his corrupt officers got time. Judge was facing 75yrs….but pleaded to 5yrs… cops 3-6. They will criminal create any chance they get. "Anything you say can AND WILL BE USED AGAINST YOU"……….Always remember that.
Would love to be the fly on the wall for these officers. Can you imagine the stories they tell to justify their occupation.
Otvo
otvo
Otvo
Otvo
1
1
making up bs scenarios!🐷
I'm 99% with Chili on 99% of his stuff, but going under a bridge with chop and both hands on the wheel things can still happen and people can get hurt with everyone sober, that being said… I've been shiiitfaced 60-70mph racin on a waverunner jumping wakes, 360s and all sorts of fun and luckily never got hurt drunk, only got hurt sober lol but PWCs have much better response time compared to larger boats, if your guna drink on a boat under age or not just be low key and don't attract attention by clowning around, like someone said they do not need PC to stop a boat for a safety inspection so don't have cans or bottles for them to see, traveling on the road is a good deal different, if he didn't flip the cop off they would all be drinking and partying lol
Stay safe Chillie✌️❤
Shut your face 🐷🤡
I love this guy. Balls of steel. GET EM!!!!!
🐖🐷🐖🐷
Handcuffs on a boat….are they all morons?
OTWO – Much greatings from Austria, Europe! 😊👍👍👍
OTVO
OTVO
It’s called reefer madness
Cop
Looks like the 🐷🤡s were unforgiving about their feelings 😢
I say 🖕🏽🐷🤬🤬🤬🤬🤡🖕🏽🐖 don’t mind there own business